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Abstract
How have social democratic parties responded to the recent economic crisis? For
many observers, the Great Recession and the prevalence of austerity in response
to it have contributed to a crisis of social democracy in Europe. This paper ex-
amines the programmatic response of social democratic parties responded to this
crisis in eleven Western European countries. It uses an original dataset that records
the salience that parties attribute to different issues and the positions that they
adopt with regards to these issues during electoral campaigns and compares the
platforms of social democratic parties before and after 2008. For this purpose, the
paper disentangles economic issues into three different categories and shows that this
is necessary in order to understand party competition during the Great Recession:
while social democratic parties shifted to the left with regards to issues relating to
welfare and economic liberalism, they largely accepted the need for budgetary rigour
and austerity policies.
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1 Introduction
The Great Recession was the deepest economic crisis in advanced capitalist countries since
the Great Depression.1 In Europe this economic crisis also led to a crisis of social demo-
cratic parties, which struggled to respond to the economic malaise.2 Prior to 2008, they
had mostly shifted towards the centre and embraced Third Way policies. However, the
Great Recession that begun in 2008 raised new doubts about the merits of this shift. The
break-down of the international financial system exposed the vulnerability of the existing
economic order and created high unemployment and inequality. Moreover, in response
to the European sovereign debt crisis governments across the continent implemented aus-
terity policies, undermining the European welfare state that social democratic parties
had built in the post-war era (Korpi, 1983; Stephens, 1979). How have social democratic
parties responded to this crisis?
To answer this question, the paper examines empirically whether and to what extent
social democratic parties changed their economic positions during the Great Recession.
Although it is too early to tell what the long-term political consequences of the crisis will
be, the purpose of studying this response is to understand how economic crises influence
party competition in the short- and medium-term (also see Clements et al., 2017). The
starting point for this analysis are two conflicting findings in the literature. First, some
authors have found that parties hardly change their positions over time (e.g. Budge, 1994;
Budge et al., 2001). In particular, social democratic parties are portrayed as parties with
a strong ideology and close ties to social movements that constrain them in responding
to changes in the economy (Adams et al., 2009). Other authors, in contrast, argued that
social democratic parties have radically changed their positions in the last few decades. In
response to globalisation, they shifted to the right resulting in a “neoliberal convergence”
of centre-left and centre-right parties (e.g. Mishra, 1999; Glyn, 2001).
In this paper, I test which of these expectations holds with evidence from the Great
Recession. I use an original dataset based on media analysis in 11 countries that allows
me to compare the salience that parties attribute to different issues and the positions
that they adopt with regards to these issues during electoral campaigns before and after
2008. Analysing this data, I present evidence that social democratic parties shifted their
positions towards the left during the crisis, which is contrary to common perceptions
in the media (Münchau, 2015; The Economist, 2016) and emerging research (English
et al., 2016; Dalton, 2016). However, their positions diverged with respect to different
issue categories. On the one hand, social democratic parties defended the welfare state
1The Great Recession is defined here as the economic crisis that begun in September 2008, when the
US investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed. It conceptualises both the 2008 financial crisis and the
Euro crisis as one economic recession.
2I refer to ‘centre-left’, ‘moderate left’, and ‘social democratic’ parties interchangeably.
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and opposed economic liberalism after the 2008 financial crisis, which partly reverted
their own Third Way. On the other hand, many parties also supported the reduction of
government deficits and taxes during the crisis – that is, they joined the chorus of austerity
that became the dominant tune during the Euro crisis. Hence, social democratic parties
adopted positions with regards to the three different issue categories (welfare, economic
liberalism, and budgetary rigour), which do not neatly align on a single left-right line of
conflict. This suggests that party competition during the Great Recession was complex
and cannot be represented on a single dimension (Otjes, 2016).
To make these arguments, the article proceeds in six steps. First, I briefly review
the existing literature. Second, I set out my expectations about the response of social
democratic parties to the Great Recession and formulate my hypotheses. Afterwards, I
introduce my dataset and explain the methods that I use to analyse party competition.
In section 5 and 6, I proceed to present my empirical results. Combining descriptive
analysis with regression analysis, I first examine the salience that social democratic parties
attributed to economic issues during the crisis. Then, I analyse the position that these
parties adopted with regard to economic issues. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Party Positions, Issue Salience, and the Economy
There is a large literature that studies the platforms on which political parties compete.
Influenced by the median-voter theorem of Downs (1957), many scholars view parties
as vote-seeking (e.g. Huber and Powell, 1994; McDonald and Budge, 2005). They argue
that there is a close link between the positions that parties take and the preferences
of the electorate. Consequently, party elites systematically respond to variations in the
distribution of voters’ preferences, which is a process that (Stimson et al., 1995) called
“dynamic representation.”3. However, given that large shifts in the distribution of voters’
preferences are rare, the programmes of parties remain relatively stable over time. As
a result, many scholars shifted their attention towards studying salience (Budge et al.,
2001; McDonald and Budge, 2005; Bélanger and Meguid, 2008). They focused on “issue
emphasis” (Budge and Farlie, 1983) because ‘[v]arying emphases on issues are by and large
the only way that parties express their policy differences’ (Budge et al., 2001, p.82). Based
on the notion of “issue ownership” (Petrocik, 1996), parties are attributed different levels
of competence in different policy areas and they have an interest to selectively emphasise
those areas in which they outshine their competitors. However, the voters’ prioritisation
of different issues can change between elections (Petrocik, 1996; Petrocik et al., 2003;
3There is some evidence for the plausible alternative hypothesis that parties respond to fluctuations
in the preferences or priorities of their constituencies and not the entire electorate (e.g Ezrow et al., 2011)
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Bélanger and Meguid, 2008). Thus, parties are expected to change the salience that they
attribute to different issues, even if they hardly change their positions over time.
The conclusion that party positions are relatively stable is shared by two other strands
of the literature. On the one hand, the classical work by Lipset and Rokkan (1967)
argues that parties are rooted in cleavages. These cleavages are relatively stable over
time and given that parties have distinct cleavage locations, they limit the positional
manoeuvrability of existing parties in response to external shocks (Hooghe and Marks,
2018). On the other hand, other authors viewing parties as policy-seeking also consider
the positions of parties relatively stable (Strøm, 1990; Müler and Strøm, 1999; Dalton
and McAllister, 2015). From this perspective, the positions of parties reflect the beliefs of
their elites, which, in turn, are shaped by the parties’ core ideologies. Ideologies provide
actors with a general frame of reference, which allow them to understand and interpret
events Assuming that these ideologies are sticky, parties are not expected to radically
change their positions, either. In particular, left-wing parties are resistant to change their
position for two reasons (Adams et al., 2009). First, left-wing parties are historically
more ideological than other parties. They were born from the labour movement in the
19th century and remained committed to engineering social change even after they had
abandoned their revolutionary ambitions (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986). Second, social
democratic parties have close ties to trade unions and social movements that restrict their
ideological flexibility even if these ties have weakened in the last few decades (Kitschelt,
1994; Piazza, 2001).
However, the problem with many of these studies is that they examine party com-
petition in a vacuum and ignore the role of contextual factors. Only recently authors
have begun to explicitly study the importance of economic conditions for party competi-
tion (Ward et al., 2015, 2011; Haupt, 2010; Adams et al., 2009). Much of this research
studies the effect of globalisation on political parties and it is closely related to research
in political economy, which has argued that globalisation constrains state intervention in
the economy (Berger, 2000; Strange, 1996). Paradoxically, this literature has also singled
out social democratic parties to make their case (Scharpf, 1987; Garrett and Lange, 1991;
Ward et al., 2011). Assuming that globalisation makes it increasingly difficult for social
democratic parties to correct undesirable market outcomes, they abandoned their core
ideologies and increasingly embraced orthodox policies. Thus, globalisation diminished
the policy differences between the left and paved the way for a “neoliberal convergence”
of mainstream parties (Mishra, 1999; Ross, 2000; Callaghan, 2000; Glyn, 2001; Pierson,
2001). Although some authors dispute this “neoliberal convergence” hypothesis (Allan and
Scruggs, 2004; Burgoon, 2001; Boix, 1998), they often agree that globalisation forces par-
ties to adapt their political programmes, albeit in a complex and variegated way. Political
parties are seen as strategic actors that use different political programmes to respond to
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domestic and international economic changes. In principle, this approach is not necessar-
ily contradictory to research, which finds that party positions are relatively stable: while
many authors emphasising stability study the basic dimensional position of parties, those
predicting change focus on individual issues. Still, the literature provides two different
expectations about how social democratic parties respond to economic changes: some
authors argue that party positions are stable and that parties only selectively emphasize
and de-emphasize certain issues, whereas others argue that parties actually adapt their
programmes in response to the domestic and international economic context. Which of
these conclusions holds up when we consider the response of social democratic parties to
the Great Recession?
The Programmatic Response of Social Democratic Par-
ties to the Great Recession: Some Expectations
The Great Recession has been a structural break for the development of the advanced
economies. It was triggered by the mortgage crisis in the United States and became a
full blown financial crisis in September 2008, when the investment bank Lehman Brothers
collapsed. This bankruptcy sent shock waves through the international financial system
and created a deep economic recession across almost all advanced capitalist countries.
Europe was hit especially hard because in 2010 the ‘American’ financial crisis turned
into a ‘European’ sovereign debt crisis. The political repercussions of this crisis are still
uncertain, but it is already becoming clear that the Great Recession was a critical juncture
that has changed long-term trends of political conflict in Europe (Hernández and Kriesi,
2016).
One important trend prior to the Great Recession was the increasing importance of
non-economic or cultural issues for party competition (Franklin et al., 1992; Kitschelt,
1994; Kriesi et al., 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Yet, the crisis increased economic
grievances throughout Europe and presented all political actors with an acute set of
economic problems. Given that materialist concerns become more important for the
electorate during times of economic hardship (e.g. Margalit, 2013; Singer, 2011; Traber
et al., 2017), I expect that all political parties attempted to capture the public mood
and increased the salience of economic issues after 2008 (hypothesis 1a). Still, it is likely
that the crisis did not effect all parties equally because parties ‘own’ different political
issues (e.g. Petrocik, 1996; Green and Hobolt, 2008; Wagner and Meyer, 2014). Although
the economy is usually addressed by all parties, social democratic parties are historically
associated with issues relating to social solidarity. Therefore, I also expect that social
democratic parties increased the salience of economic issues more than other parties,
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which are less concerned with social justice (e.g. Conservative parties) or more associated
with non-economic issues (e.g. the Greens or the radical populist right), as expressed in
hypothesis 1b.
Salience Hypothesis I (H1a): Social democratic parties increased the salience of economic
issues in response to the crisis.
Salience Hypothesis II (H1b): Social democratic parties increased the salience of economic
issues more than other parties, which are less associated with issues relating to social
solidarity.
In response to the economic turmoil, I also expect that social democratic parties
changed their positions on economic issues. Many studies showing that the positions
of parties are relatively stable, focused their analysis on long-term trends during peri-
ods of relative economic stability. In contrast, a growing literature in political economy
has emphasized the importance of crises as critical junctures (Capoccia and Kelemen,
2007; Collier and Collier, 1991). Politics may appear stable during “normal times” due
to path-dependency (Pierson, 2000), but crises shake the foundations of existing social
systems. The resulting uncertainty allows policy entrepreneurs to engineer institutional
change (Capoccia, 2015) and often leads to institutional, political, and policy change
with significant legacies (Gourevitch, 1986). They create the perfect pre-conditions for
paradigm change, as outlined by Hall (1993), because the uncertainty opens up windows
of opportunity, during which ideas can serve as explanations of what went wrong, and how
to fix it (Blyth, 2002; Matthijs, 2011). For social democratic parties, the Great Recession
should have been such a critical event because it provided them with a golden opportu-
nity to renew their traditional socio-economic programmes, as expressed in hypothesis 2a.
Importantly, for other parties this opportunity did not exist to the same extent. While
some of them already had more leftist positions prior to the Great Recession (e.g. far left
parties), other parties (e.g. conservative parties) could not shift their positions leftwards
due to the pro-market ideologies that they adhere to. Hence, I expect that the effect of
the crisis should have been particularly large for social democratic parties (hypothesis
2b).
Position Hypothesis I (H2a): Social democratic parties responded to the crisis by moving
to the left on economic issues.
Position Hypothesis II (H2b): Social democratic parties responded to the crisis by moving
to the left on economic issues more than other parties.
However, the impact of the crisis was not uniform across all economic issues. Impor-
tantly, in the wake of the crisis one has to distinguish between three issue categories: (1)
issues that relate to the welfare state and redistribution; (2) issues that relate to eco-
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nomic liberalism; and (3) issues that relate to the budget of the government (see table
1). This distinction is necessary because in order to capture the complex political impact
of the crisis. First, the crisis was widely narrated as a crisis that resulted from excessive
liberalisation of the financial system (e.g. Blanchard et al., 2010; Bean, 2010). This pre-
sented centre-left parties with a window of opportunity to oppose economic liberalism and
distance themselves from the causes of the Great Recession. Similarly, low-income house-
holds, which social democratic parties claim to represent, were particularly at risk during
the Great Recession due to the increase in unemployment and economic uncertainty.
Thus, the Great Recession also provided social democratic parties with an opportunity to
renew their support for the welfare state. Yet, with regards to macroeconomic policies,
social democratic parties had less lee-way to change their policies. Most governments
stimulated the economy immediately after the financial crash in 2008 (Hall, 2013; Pon-
tusson and Raess, 2012), but leading policy makers soon began to demand austerity when
the financial crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis. As Matthijs and McNamara (2015)
critically point out, conventional wisdom held that this crisis was caused by excessive
government debt and ‘irresponsible’ behaviour by the debtor countries. Social democratic
parties in these countries were, thus, forced to accept austerity measures in return for
bail-out packages from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (e.g.
PASOK in Greece, PS in Portugal, and PSOE in Spain).
Table 1: List of Economic Issue Categories (adopted from Kriesi et al. 2008)
Categories Description of Left-Wing Positions
Welfare Support for the welfare state and redistribution
through taxes and benefits
Economic Liberalism Opposition to competition, deregulation, and priva-
tization
Budgetary Rigour Opposition to a rigid budgetary policy and the re-
duction of taxes (without an explicit redistributive
character)
Parties in creditor countries or outside the Eurozone also largely accepted this shift
to austerity. For example, the German SPD already supported the introduction of a
constitutional debt brake in 2009 and promised to reduce government debt as one of the
key pillars of its economic programme in 2013 (Social Democratic Party of Germany,
2013). Similarly, the Labour party in the UK accepted the need for fiscal consolidation.
The party opposed the spending cuts by the Conservative government, but it also adopted
a fiscal commitment prior to the 2015 election promising to ‘balance the books and deliver
a surplus on the current budget and falling national debt in the next Parliament’ (Balls,
2014). Consequently, we need to disentangle issues that relate to the government’s budget
from other economic issues. In particular, I expect that left-wing parties did not shift
to the left with regards to budgetary issues during the crisis but that they addressed
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these issues more often in order to signal economic competence (Kraft, 2017) and to
appeal to fiscally conservative voters, who favour balanced budgets. Facing attacks from
other political parties, they attempted to present themselves as economically competent
and responsible in this way. These expectations are summarised in hypotheses 3a and
3b.
Programmatic Differentiation Hypothesis I (H3a): Social democratic parties increased the
salience of issues relating to budgetary rigour in response to the crisis.
Programmatic Differentiation Hypothesis II (H3b): Social democratic parties did not move
to the left on issues relating to budgetary rigour in response to the crisis.
Still, there are reasons to believe that the expected shifts by social democratic parties,
as expressed in hypotheses 1 to 3, did not happen in all countries equally. In particular,
the depth and length of the crisis should have influenced the response of left-wing parties
to the Great Recession. In countries that escaped the crisis relatively unscathed, left-
wing parties had less reason to increase the salience of economic issues and change their
position with regards to issues like welfare and economic liberalism. Importantly, while
they might have also shifted to the left in the immediate aftermath of financial crisis, I
expect that they moderated their positions again as the impact of the recession waned in
their country. Therefore, in countries that were hit especially hard by the economic crisis,
we can expect that parties altered their positions on the economy more fundamentally,
which is formulated in hypothesis 4.
Economic Conditionality Hypothesis (H4): The depth and length of the economic crisis
influenced the effect of the crisis: in countries where the economic crisis was severe, social
democratic parties changed salience and positions more than in countries where it was less
severe.
Data and Methods
In order to analyse the programmatic response of social democratic parties to the Great
Recession, I study the platforms on which parties compete before elections. Electoral
campaigns provide a good indicator of party positions because parties have to develop
a coherent programme prior to elections and, thus, their positions crystallise. In this
article I use a new and original dataset that is an update to the dataset used by Kriesi
et al. (2008, 2012). The data was collected by the POLCON project to study the political
consequences of the Great Recession. It measures party positions by analysing how they
are represented by the mass media during electoral campaigns. This type of data is
appropriate for studying the response of parties to the crisis for three reasons. First, the
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data allows me to analyse both the salience that parties attribute to economic issues and
the positions that they take towards these issues, which are important aspects of party
competition in the 21st century. Second, the data shows the positions that parties adopt
in public discourse and, thus, reflects the positions of parties with regards to the most
important issues of the day. This should make any changes induced by the crisis more
visible than in other sources. Finally, the data enables me to disentangle economic issues
into different issue categories, which is necessary in order to understand party competition
in the context of the economic crisis.
Unfortunately, the data also has some short-comings. Most importantly, media biases
might misrepresent some actors and provide limited information about small parties and
non-salient issues. Alternative data sources avoid such biases. In particular, the Manifesto
Project (MARPOR) (Volkens et al., 2017) has created a large database that is commonly
used to study party positions. However, this data cannot be used in this paper because the
coding scheme does not capture positive and negative stances for all issues that are relevant
for my analysis, which would directly allow for the calculation of positions (Gemenis, 2013;
Dolezal et al., 2014). Most importantly, the data from MARPOR does not allow me to
disentangle economic issues as described above. Therefore, as suggested by Helbling and
Tresch (2011), I use media analysis in order to study parties’ positions on sub-issues
instead.
Specifically, the following analysis is based on the detailed coding of newspapers dur-
ing thirty-one election campaigns in eleven different Western European countries. These
countries include seven Northern European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Ireland,
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and four Southern European coun-
tries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). In each country, I use the last election prior
the beginning of the crisis in 2008, against which I compare all electoral campaigns that
have occurred from 2009 to 2015.4 The newspapers that were used for this analysis and
the detailed list of the electoral campaigns and their classification is included in appendix
1. From each newspaper, a representative sample of relevant articles is coded by means
of core sentence analysis (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 1997; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings, 2001),
which records the relationship between a subject (an actor) and an object (another actor
or an issue) on a scale from −1 to +1. In total, the resulting dataset contains 81,159 core
sentences and for each election I have, on average, 2136 core sentences. The actors men-
tioned in the newspapers are coded based on their party affiliation, while the issues were
coded inductively and classified into more than 200 categories. From these categories, I
created three meta-categories about the economy, as shown in appendix 2: welfare, eco-
nomic liberalism, and budgetary rigour. Following (Kriesi et al., 2008), I assume that all
4Elections that occurred in 2008 are excluded from the analysis due to their proximity to the break-
down of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
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other issues are either embedded in a second, cultural dimension of political conflict or in
none of the two dimensions.5
In order to test my hypotheses, I use the data to compute two key measures for each
party for the individual issue categories: salience and left-right position (see appendix 3).
Salience for each party on an individual issue is simply the share of core sentences that a
party devotes to a given issue compared to all core sentences coded for that party during
the election campaign. The left-right position for a party on a given issue is the average
direction of all statements about that particular issue, which ranges from −1 to +1, where
−1 is the left end of the spectrum and +1 is the right end of the spectrum. Afterwards,
I also calculate the salience and left-right position for every party on the aggregate level,
i.e. for all economic issues. In this case, salience is simply the sum of the salience for all
three issue individual categories. The aggregate left-right position for any given party is
calculated as the mean of all statements from the three economic categories, weighted by
the salience of the individual categories.
First, I use these measures descriptively to compare the strategies of left-wing parties
before and after the beginning of the crisis. In each section, I start by analysing the
aggregate changes, but I also analyse the changes with respect to each individual issue
category in order to examine the sources of the aggregate changes. Second, I use regression
analysis to test whether the effects of the crisis are statistically significant. For this
purpose, my unit of the analysis is a given party for each national election campaign.
In total, this gives me a dataset with 198 observations across eleven countries. Note
that my data is heavily “cross-sectional dominant” (Stimson, 1985) but that it also has a
time dimension. To account for this fact, I use generalised least square (GLS) regressions
because it can be shown that GLS estimators are more efficient than ordinary least square
(OLS) estimators, when there is a certain degree of correlation between the residuals in a
regression model (Greene, 2012, p. 372).6 As listed in appendix 4, the dependent variables
for my analysis are (1) the salience that parties attribute to economic issues and (2) the
left-right position that parties take on these issues. My key independent variables are
party family (operationalised as shown in appendix 5) and a dummy variable that equals
one when the election occurred after 2008 and zero otherwise. The effect of the crisis
on any given party family is then tested through an interaction effect between these two
variables. To test the conditionality of the crisis effect, I use a three-way interaction term
5This approach excludes economic issues that have a European dimension from the analysis (e.g.
Eurobonds or support for the European Stability Mechanism). These issues became more important
during the crisis, but they were not politicised in the same way across all countries included in this study.
Importantly, in some countries European integration is still more associated with cultural issues than
with economic issues (Otjes and Katsanidou, 2017), which makes an analysis of European issues more
difficult.
6As a robustness check, I repeated the analysis using an OLS estimator. The results are extremely
similar to the ones shown here.
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between party family, my dummy variable, and the unemployment rate.7 Finally, I also
include other control variables that could potentially explain party positions on economic
issues, including unemployment, GDP growth, government debt and deficit, government
status, and country fixed effects. Other confounding variables are not included in the
regression model shown here due to the small number of observations.8
Social Democratic Parties and the Crisis: Changes in
Issue Emphasis
In response to the Great Recession political parties were forced to address ‘old’ economic
issues (like unemployment) more resolutely, but they also had to find answers to ‘new’
issues (like bank bailouts or the stability of the financial system). As a result, the salience
that mainstream parties attribute to economic issues increased during the crisis in almost
all countries (figure 1). This change was large in countries that were hit particularly hard
by the crisis (e.g. Italy, Spain, and Portugal), but the salience of economic issues also
dramatically increased in other countries (Austria, Switzerland, and the UK). Moreover,
this increase in salience was largely systemic, i.e. changes in salience were not idiosyncratic
to individual party families. Instead, the salience of economic issues in the media increased
for all party families and, in particular, mainstream parties moved in tandem in response
to the crisis. It is, therefore, difficult to distinguish between an effect at the party level
and an effect at the level of the party system descriptively.
In order to test whether the differences between party families are statistically signifi-
cant, I use regression analysis, as described above. The results of this analysis are shown
in model 1 of table 2. They indicate that far right parties as well as green parties consis-
tently emphasized economic issues less than the moderate right (the baseline). Moreover,
the crisis had a positive and statistically significant impact on salience, as indicated by
the coefficient for the crisis dummy variable. Yet, all the interaction terms between party
families and this dummy are small and not statistically significant, which indicates that
the crisis did not systematically alter the pattern of party competition with regards to
salience. In particular, the salience of economic issues for moderate left-wing parties and
moderate right-parties increased in tandem in response to the economic crisis, which is
7The unemployment rate is used as an indicator for the depth of the economic crisis for three reasons.
First, it measures the impact of the financial crisis on the real economy. Second, and related, the
unemployment rate is a proxy for the level of economic grievances that the population of any country
experiences during an economic crisis. Third, unemployment is a good measure because it is easily
comparable across countries. Other possible specifications of this variable were used as a robustness
check but they did not change the results (e.g. GDP growth, inflation, sovereign debt and deficit).
8Other variables were included in further models (e.g. Eurozone membership, being a recipient of
bail-outs, the presence of far right and far left parties, or the type of economic system). None of these
variables turned out to be significant.
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Figure 1: Issue Salience of All Economic Issues by Party Family by Country
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evidence against hypothesis 1b. Similarly, there is no evidence that the response of so-
cial democratic parties to the crisis was influenced by the strength of the crisis. The
three-way interaction term in the second model in table 2 is not statistically significant,
which suggests that the response of social democratic parties was similar in all countries
independent of the depth of the crisis.
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Table 2: GLS Regression - Salience of Economic Issues by Different Party Families
Dependent Variable
Aggregate I Aggregate II Welfare Eco Lib Budget
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Far Right −0.16∗∗∗ −0.27 −0.04 −0.03 −0.08∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.21) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Liberal −0.05 −0.08 −0.0000 0.02 −0.07∗∗
(0.06) (0.18) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Moderate Left −0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 −0.07∗∗
(0.05) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Far Left −0.01 0.24 0.03 0.08∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Green −0.18∗∗∗ −0.26 −0.05 −0.05 −0.08∗∗
(0.06) (0.18) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Other −0.16∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.04 −0.05 −0.07∗∗
(0.06) (0.19) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Crisis Election 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.09∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.04) (0.13) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Unemployment (t-1) 0.002 0.01 −0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.01) (0.02) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Inflation (t-1) 0.02 0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.001 0.004 −0.002 0.003 −0.0000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Gov Deficit (t-1) −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗∗ 0.001 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gov Debt (t-1) −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Government (t-1) −0.02 −0.02 −0.03∗ 0.03 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Prime Minister (t-1) −0.01 −0.02 0.02 −0.02 −0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Far Right x Crisis Election −0.03 0.02 −0.05 −0.04 0.06
(0.07) (0.22) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Liberal x Crisis Election 0.02 0.19 0.002 −0.05 0.07∗
(0.07) (0.19) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Moderate Left x Crisis Election 0.03 0.05 0.01 −0.03 0.06∗
(0.06) (0.17) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Far Left x Crisis Election 0.01 −0.22 −0.01 −0.06 0.07∗∗
(0.06) (0.20) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Green x Crisis Election −0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.01 0.03
(0.07) (0.19) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Other x Crisis Election 0.03 −0.13 0.005 −0.03 0.05
(0.07) (0.21) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Moderate Left x Unemployment (t-1) −0.01
(0.02)
Crisis Election x Unemployment (t-1) −0.004
(0.02)
Mod Left x Crisis x Unempl (t-1) 0.003
(0.02)
Constant 0.39∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.02 0.08∗
(0.09) (0.14) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 198 198 198 198 198
Log Likelihood 65.23 27.95 136.37 138.57 163.26
Akaike Inf. Crit. -66.46 34.10 -208.74 -213.14 -262.53
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 33.31 170.77 -108.96 -113.37 -162.75
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Reference party: Moderate Right
Reference country: United Kingdom
Note: Country fixed effects are included in the models but not shown. Similarly, three-way interaction terms for other
party families are included in model 2 but not shown.
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Still, it is important to disaggregate these changes into the three categories identified
above. Figure 2 plots the salience of these issues separately for social democratic parties.9
It indicates that the crisis did not systematically change party competition for welfare and
economic liberalism. Generally, the salience of issues relating to the welfare state is higher
in Northern than in Southern European countries, which is confirmed by the country
fixed effects in model 3 that are not shown in the table. Except in Italy, this general
divide between Northern and Southern Europe survived the Great Recession, suggesting
that differences in salience between countries might reflect deeper structural differences
between the two regions (e.g. different welfare state traditions). At the same time, some
social democratic parties increased the salience of economic liberalism during the crisis
whereas their sister parties in other countries decreased the salience. Thus, there is not a
single pattern that captures changes in salience across all countries, which is confirmed by
the regression analyses in model 3 and 4 of table 2. However, model 5 of the same table
shows that this is not true for the third category. The results indicate that moderate
right-wing parties addressed issues relating to budgetary rigour more than other parties
before 2008, but that social democratic parties, liberal, and far left parties increased the
salience of budgetary rigour after 2008. As shown in figure, the salience of budgetary
issues increased for moderate centre-left parties in nearly all countries, as expected by
hypothesis 3a. In sum, this suggests that social democratic parties increasingly spoke
about budgetary issues during the crisis, but in the absence of evidence about the positions
of social democratic parties it is not clear whether this happened because social democratic
parties opposed or supported budgetary rigour.10 Therefore, I now turn towards analysing
the positions of social democratic parties.
Social Democratic Parties and the Crisis: Changes in
Issue Positions
The economic crisis did not only change the salience of economic issues, but it also in-
fluenced the positions that parties took on these issues. Figure 3 compares the left-right
position before and after 2008 for the centre-left and centre-right parties. It illustrates
that every social democratic party shifted to the left after 2008, except the Labour Party
in Ireland and the PvDA in the Netherlands. On average, these parties shifted their ag-
gregate left-right position by 0.15 points. Furthermore, in most countries the moderate
right as well as other parties (not shown in figure 3) moved in the opposite direction
9Appendix 6 shows the nominal changes for each issue category. In appendix 7 parties are clustered
according to these changes.
10These effects were again not systematically affected by the depth of the crisis. The three-way inter-
action used above is not significant for any of the categories, as shown in appendix 8.
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Figure 2: Salience of Different Economic Issues for Social Democratic Parties by Country
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as social democratic parties. Hence, there is evidence that both hypotheses 2a and 2b
are true: the crisis led to a divergence between mainstream parties and, thereby, partly
reversed the neoliberal convergence among mainstream parties that had occurred prior to
the crisis.
In order to test whether these differences are statistically significant, I again use re-
gression analysis. The results in model 1 of table 3 show that the moderate left- and
right-wing parties indeed had programmes that were very similar prior to the crisis be-
cause the coefficient for moderate left-wing parties is not statistically significant when the
14
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Figure 3: Average Party Positions on Economic Issues by Party Family by Country
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moderate right is used as the reference category. The differences between mainstream
parties on economic issues had all but eroded and only far left parties had programmes
that were significantly different from the mainstream in economic terms. However, the
Great Recession changed this picture. As indicated by the interaction term, social demo-
cratic parties shifted leftwards and competed on a programme that was different from the
programme of the moderate right. This is true even when controlling for other factors
that could potentially influence a party’s position on the left-right dimension of polit-
ical conflict, including economic conditions and potential constraints from government
responsibility. Thus, there is evidence that the Great Recession ended the neoliberal con-
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vergence, i.e. parties distinguished themselves again by different economic positions, as
partisan theory expects (e.g. Hibbs, 1977).
Table 3: GLS Regression - Left Right Positions of Different Party Families
Dependent Variable
Aggregate I Aggregate II Welfare Eco Lib Budget
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Far Right 0.21 −0.48 0.10 0.43∗ 0.17
(0.17) (0.62) (0.21) (0.24) (0.28)
Liberal 0.22 −0.04 0.12 0.32 0.03
(0.17) (0.52) (0.20) (0.23) (0.28)
Moderate Left 0.05 −0.12 0.07 0.12 0.02
(0.14) (0.46) (0.17) (0.19) (0.23)
Far Left −0.39∗∗∗ −0.70 −0.32∗ −0.53∗∗∗ −0.11
(0.14) (0.57) (0.17) (0.20) (0.24)
Green 0.04 0.13 −0.22 0.16 −0.23
(0.17) (0.52) (0.21) (0.24) (0.28)
Other −0.21 0.20 −0.18 0.09 −0.29
(0.17) (0.55) (0.21) (0.24) (0.29)
Crisis Election 0.28∗∗ 0.35 0.34∗∗ 0.07 0.39∗
(0.12) (0.37) (0.15) (0.17) (0.20)
Unemployment (t-1) 0.002 0.03 0.04∗ −0.002 −0.05∗
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Inflation (t-1) −0.06 −0.03 0.03 −0.09 −0.12
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Gov Deficit (t-1) 0.01 0.02 0.002 0.01 −0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP Growth (t-1) −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.005 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gov Debt (t-1) −0.003 −0.002 −0.01∗ −0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Government (t-1) 0.08 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.21
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15)
Prime Minister (t-1) 0.09 0.10 −0.11 0.10 −0.05
(0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.19)
Far Right x Crisis Election −0.23 0.56 −0.06 −0.64∗∗ −0.25
(0.20) (0.66) (0.24) (0.28) (0.33)
Liberal x Crisis Election −0.08 0.52 0.04 −0.04 −0.13
(0.20) (0.56) (0.24) (0.28) (0.33)
Moderate Left x Crisis Election −0.47∗∗∗ −0.28 −0.46∗∗ −0.56∗∗ −0.43
(0.17) (0.50) (0.20) (0.23) (0.28)
Far Left x Crisis Election −0.37∗∗ 0.07 −0.25 −0.12 −0.86∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.61) (0.20) (0.23) (0.28)
Green x Crisis Election −0.32 −0.33 −0.15 −0.26 −0.04
(0.20) (0.56) (0.25) (0.28) (0.33)
Other x Crisis Election 0.17 −0.21 0.11 0.04 0.11
(0.21) (0.62) (0.26) (0.30) (0.35)
Moderate Left x Unemployment (t-1) 0.02
(0.06)
Crisis Election x Unemployment (t-1) −0.02
(0.05)
Mod Left x Crisis x Unempl (t-1) −0.03
(0.06)
Constant −0.12 −0.38 −0.58∗ 0.23 0.78∗
(0.25) (0.43) (0.30) (0.35) (0.41)
Observations 198 198 198 198 198
Log Likelihood -112.03 -139.62 -146.37 -169.33 -196.94
Akaike Inf. Crit. 288.07 369.24 356.74 402.66 457.87
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 387.84 505.90 456.52 502.43 557.65
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Reference party: Moderate Right
Reference country: United Kingdom
Note: Country fixed effects are included in the models but not shown. Similarly, three-way interaction terms for other
party families are included in model 2 but not shown.
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Model 2 in table 3 examines whether these changes were conditional on the depth of
the crisis. Given that the three-way interaction term is not statistically significant, this
does not seem to be the case. Social democratic parties shifted to the left independently of
the depth of the crisis and, thus, there is no evidence for hypothesis 4. Instead, the crisis
was apparently deep enough to induce social democratic parties to shift their positions in
all the countries studied here. Still, it remains unclear whether this shift occurred with
respect to all the issues category identified above.
Figure 4 plots the attitudes towards these issues on a scale from -1 to +1, where +1
means that a party is completely opposed to welfare, completely in favour of economic
liberalism or completely in favour of budgetary rigour, respectively. The graph shows that
many moderate left-wing parties had been strongly pro welfare even before 2008, but as
the welfare state came under attack during the economic crisis, social democratic parties
defended it even more resolutely. Only the Dutch PvdA and the Italian PD shifted to the
right and adopted a more ambiguous position towards the welfare state during the crisis.
This picture is similar for the position of social democratic parties towards economic
liberalism, except that many social democratic parties had more ambiguous positions
towards economic liberalism before the crisis. Reflecting the policies of the Third Way,
social democratic parties in Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland,
and the UK were in favour or had an ambivalent position towards economic liberalism
prior to 2008. The social democratic parties in the other countries were not clearly opposed
to it, either. However, after 2008 social democratic parties shifted strongly towards the
left, thereby moving closer to their core ideology again. Thus, most social democratic
parties campaigned again for the welfare state and against economic liberalism during
the crisis.
The positions of social democratic parties with regards to fiscal policy do not follow
the same pattern. Instead, many social democratic parties changed their positions on
budgetary rigour in the opposite direction. Many parties already had an ambivalent
position towards fiscal policies before the crisis, but some became even more supportive
of budgetary rigour during the crisis. The centre-left parties in France and Portugal were
the only parties that adopted a weakly negative position towards budgetary rigour during
the crisis after they had shifted their positions towards the left compared to the pre-crisis
period. Nonetheless, their positions on budgetary rigour were still a lot further to the
right compared to their positions on welfare and economic liberalism, as shown in figure
4. Therefore, in general the centre-left mirrored the positions of the political right and
campaigned for lower government budget deficits and government debt in response to the
crisis. Contrary to existing evidence from parliamentary speeches (Maatsch, 2014), this
happened in both creditor and debtor countries.
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Figure 4: Average Positions of Social Democratic Parties on Different Economic Issues by
Country
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Again, these impressions can be substantiated by regression analysis. For this purpose,
I repeat the analysis from above and use the party’s average position on each individual
issue category as dependent variables. The results show that prior to 2008, social demo-
cratic parties had not campaigned on programmes that were significantly different from
other parties. However, during the crisis social democratic parties changed their pro-
grammes with regard to both welfare and economic liberalism, as indicated in model 3
and 4 of table 3. Reflecting the new-found scepticism of the moderate left towards (fi-
nancial) markets, this shift was particularly large for economic liberalism, as suggested
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above. In contrast, the crisis did not lead to a differentiation between between centre-left
and centre-right parties with regards to budgetary policies. The crisis induced centre-
right parties to become more ‘austere’, which is indicated by the positive and statistically
significant dummy variable in model 5 of table 3. At the same time, the interaction term
is not statistically significant, indicating that social democratic parties had no position
on austerity that was significantly different from the position of centre-right parties after
2008. Importantly, this happened across most countries and did not depend on the depth
of crisis (appendix 8). Consequently, there is evidence that hypothesis 3b is true, indicat-
ing that the Great Recession did not affect all aspects of party competition (on economic
issues) equally. Contrary to the common assumption that parties bundle issues together,
which leads to consistent policy packages, social democratic parties had a differentiated
response to the crisis as they adopted positions with regard to different issue categories
that are usually considered to be on different ends of the left-right spectrum.
Figure 5: Average Positions of Social Democratic Parties on Different Economic Issues by
Election Type
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Note: Countries that only had one election from 2009 to 2015 are not shown in the graph.
The two elections in Greece in 2012 are treated as a single observation.
Finally, for countries with more than one election during the economic crisis, we can
analyse how stable the positions of social democratic parties were during the crisis. Figure
5 shows the average position of social democratic parties in eight countries by election
type. It suggests that the most important change in the programmes of social democratic
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parties happened before the first crisis election: they shifted towards the left on economic
liberalism and, hence, their positions on welfare and economic liberalism converged. At
the same time, they slightly shifted towards the right on budgetary rigour. Prior to
the second crisis elections, social democratic parties followed up on these initial shifts by
shifting further to the left with regard to economic liberalism, while shifting further to the
right on budgetary rigour. This is further evidence that social democratic parties turned
away from their Third Way during the Great Recession, but that they did not attempt
to engineer a paradigm shift with regard to fiscal policies. Importantly, this created some
inconsistencies within their programmes: while austerity might be compatible with state
intervention (e.g. minimum wage or financial regulation), defending the welfare state is
not. Instead, austerity usually leads to welfare state retrenchment (Armingeon et al.,
2016), which would make it very difficult for social democratic parties to implement their
programmes if they were voted into government again. Further evidence from countries
with additional elections during the crisis suggests that there are two different ways that
social democratic parties might resolve this tension (as shown in appendix 9). On the one
hand, the PS in Portugal shifted its position on austerity towards the left prior to the
election in 2015. On the other hand, PASOK in Greece shifted its position on economic
liberalism and welfare to the centre again in 2015 after the far left party Syriza had
successfully established itself as the main actor on the left of the party system. This
indicates that social democratic parties are likely to further adjust their programmatic
positions in the wake of the crisis but that they might not resolve the internal tensions
within their platforms in a uniform way across Europe.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Great Recession systematically changed the platform on which the
European moderate left competed in elections. In terms of salience, social democratic
parties paid more attention towards economic issues again, but this was mirrored by a
general increase of salience for all parties. Centre-left parties moved in tandem with
centre-right and liberal parties and emphasised economic issues more during the Great
Recession. In this way, the crisis halted a previous trend that saw mainstream parties
appeal to cultural issues prior to the crisis. However, in terms of positions, left-wing parties
set themselves apart from other parties in response to the Great Recession. Despite the
popular perception that the left was missing during the crisis and failed to defend its
core ideology during the crisis, my findings paint a more nuanced picture. In almost all
countries studied here, social democratic parties defended the welfare state and became
more sceptical of economic liberalism. Thereby, the centre-left retracted large parts of its
Third Way policies and reversed the neoliberal convergence that scholars had observed
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prior to the Great Recession. Yet, these parties did not shift to the left in response to the
crisis with regard to all categories. Importantly, social democratic parties accepted the
need for fiscal consolidation and budgetary rigour, which created some tensions within
their platforms. These tensions are signs of a deep identity crisis that social democratic
parties faced in the wake of the economic crisis and that many of them have failed to
resolve until this day.
However, at this point there are already at least three implications from the evidence
presented in this paper that are worth noting. First, the Great Recession initiated a
critical juncture for party competition in Europe. While my evidence shows that parties
changed the salience that they attribute to economic issues in tandem, they did change
their programmes in different directions in response to the economic shock. Although we
cannot be completely certain that parties will not shift back to their pre-crisis position,
it confirms that parties are strategic actors that respond to changes in their economic
context. Second, the evidence also shows that parties do not always change their positions
in the same direction on all issues categories. Consequently, we need to be careful when
studying party programmes in aggregate terms: although it is certainly useful to rank
parties based on their left-right positions, scholars also need to appreciate that parties
sometimes bundle policy packages together that do not fall on the same end of the left-
right dimension. Hence, we should pay more attention towards studying the positions
of parties on individual issues and analyse how the positions of parties with respect to
different issues relate to each other. Finally, social democratic parties adopted a rather
inconsistent programme during the Great Recession. In particular, the budgetary policies
that social democratic parties have put forward can neither be easily squared with their
support for the welfare state nor with their own core ideology. Therefore, we need further
research to understand why social democratic parties accepted austerity in response to
the crisis. This research would not only shed light on the distributive conflicts associated
with fiscal policies, but it might also help us to make sense of the current crisis of social
democratic parties in Europe.
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